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Introduction
Johann Gottlieb Fichte called his philosophy “Wissenschaftslehre (WL),” which aims to 
describe the system of human knowledge toward its absolute ground, assuming that there 
must be such a system. However, even if there really is a system of human knowledge, the 
actual description of WL does not necessarily hit the mark2. Thus, Fichte repeatedly rewrote 
the WL. The contents of these works are usually distinguished as the former period (the Jena 
period, 1794-1799) which supposes as the ground das absolute Ich (the absolute I), and the 
later period (the Berlin period, 1800-1814), which supposes das Absolute (the absolute), and 
studies on Fichte often focus on WL in a specific year.
On the other hand, there is no doubt that Fichte retained one aspect through those 
rewrites. Namely, in each moment, he placed WL as idealism, and in particular, “transcendental 
idealism” (or “critical idealism”). As is well known, transcendental idealism is the term that 
Kant assigned to his position in Critique of Pure Reason (KrV), and Fichte continued to 
assert that WL is transcendental idealism and such that stands at the point that Kant should 
have reached3.
Incidentally, Kant developed an interesting argument in the section “Fourth Paralogism, 
of Ideality (of Outer Relations)” in the first edition of KrV. He asserted that the opponent 
of transcendental idealism is “transcendental realism,” which regards outer things as things 
in itself, and this is also “empirical idealism,” and in contrast, transcendental idealism can 
be “empirical realism” (cf. KrV, A369f.). Regardless of the meaning of this contrast, the 
following question arises by comparing it with Fichte’s assertion: If Fichte’s transcendental 
1 An earlier version of this work was read on September 10, 2015 at the IX. Congress of the International 
Fichte Society.
2 “If our Wissenschaftslehre is an accurate portrayal of this system of the human mind, then, like this 
system itself, it is absolutely certain and infallible. But the question is precisely whether and to what 
extent our portrayal is accurate…” (BWL, GA I/2, 146; EPW, p. 130).
3 “I have always said, and here I repeat, that my system is none other than the Kantian system. I.e., it 
contains the same view of the subject, though it proceeds in a manner that is entirely independent of 
Kant’s presentation.” (VNDWL, GA I/4, 184; IW, p. 4) “I know full well that Kant has by no means 
actually constructed a system of this sort… Nevertheless, I am equally certain that Kant has entertained 
the thought of such a system… and that his assertions make coherent sense only on this assumption.” 
(230; pp. 62-63)
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idealism follows as an extension of Kant’s system, it is also expected to have the aspect of 
empirical realism. However, it is also certain that his idealism gives the impression that it is 
stronger than Kant’s. Then, to what extent and in what meaning is it empirical realism?
One easy solution may be to argue that they cannot be simply compared to each 
other, even if the same term is used between them. However, such an answer will never be 
satisfactory, because it will result in ignoring the opinion of Fichte himself. For instance, in a 
part of the Second Introduction to Wissenschaftslehre, he oppugns the contemporary tendency 
that regards Kant as a realist, and explains his original interpretation of empirical realism (cf. 
VNDWL, GA I/4, 243; IW, pp. 75-76). In addition, in a passage in the TL lecture from his 
Berlin period, he states that WL is transcendental idealism as well as empirical realism (cf. TL, 
GA II/14, 372).
Thus, we must also consider Fichte to be an empirical realist, though this will inevitably 
give rise to the question of whether the radicalization of the Kantian system may result in 
criticism of transcendental realism different from the original. I believe that this problem has 
not been investigated sufficiently.
Based on the aforementioned interest in the issues, this paper aims to examine the 
empirical realistic aspects of the Jena and the Berlin years of Fichte’s WL. The argument 
proceeds as follows: (1) I briefly reconstruct Kant’s position in “Fourth Paralogism,” (2) I 
verify Fichte’s understanding of empirical realism in the Second Introduction, (3) I contrast 
the view on thing in itself between Kant and Fichte, and then, (4) I investigate Fichte’s new 
idea about empirical realism in TL. My aim is to obtain a clue to the Wissenschaftslehre 
of the Berlin period, especially the idea of the Bild, which I found extremely difficult to 
understand.
1. Transcendental Idealism and Empirical Realism
Kant’s original purpose in “Fourth Paralogism” was to refute the idealism that argues 
that the existence of outer objects is doubtful4. The argument on transcendental realism 
was proposed in the middle of it. The discourse of this part is somewhat entangled, and it 
seems that Kant himself was dissatisfied with its persuasion. In fact, after the defense in 
Prolegomena against the criticisms, this passage was deleted in the second edition of KrV, 
and a new argument called “Refutation of Idealism” was added in other parts. However, 
I do not intend to verify if his refutation of idealism is indeed successful, but will briefly 
4 Therefore, it is not supposed here such a radical idealism that simply deny the existence of outer 
objects, what Kant named “dogmatic idealism.”
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reconstruct Kant’s argument in “Fourth Paralogism” to approach the issue.
Kant begins with the two presuppositions shareable by the opponent, that is, idealist; 
(A) only something that is in ourselves can be perceived immediately, and (B) only my 
own existence can be an object of mere perception (cf. KrV, A367). Herein, Kant aims to 
demonstrate the reality of outer objects, relying on his own argument on space and time in 
“transcendental aesthetics,” though it initially seems that an idealistic conclusion is to be 
derived from the aforementioned presuppositions—that we will never be able to be sure of 
the existence of outer objects because they are not perceptible immediately, and so we can 
only infer their existence (cf. A368f.).
According to Kant, however, this is false because a wrong presupposition is added that 
outer objects must be things in themselves that exist independently without our sense. Kant 
termed this wrong position “transcendental realism.” A transcendental realist will consider 
that the reality of outer existence to be merely the reality of things in themselves. Then 
because of (A) and (B), we are not able to immediately perceive things in themselves, but 
only to infer its being from its presentation. Thus, an idealistic conclusion is inferred, that is, 
“even with our best consciousness of our representation of these things, it is obviously far 
from certain that if the representation exists, then the object corresponding to it would also 
exist” (A371). Kant termed this view that argues about the limitation of empirical perception 
“empirical idealism,” which is the consequence of transcendental realism.
In contrast, the position of Kant himself is “transcendental idealism,” which is the 
doctrine that regards all appearances as mere representations, not as things themselves, and 
space and time as the subjective form of our intuition (cf. A369). According to this position, 
matters are merely representations. These representations are called outer, not because they 
are in relation to objects that are outer in themselves, but relate perceptions to space, is which 
all the external are, but which itself “is in us” (A370). 
Kant asserts that transcendental idealism is also an empirical realism that admits the 
existence of outer things, and can therefore be dualism. Because the outer things are also 
my representations, I perceive my representations immediately. “I am no more necessitated 
to draw inferences in respect of the reality of external objects than I am in regard to the 
reality of the objects of my inner sense (my thoughts)” (A371). Thus, the empirical-idealistic 
anxiety that the existence of outer objects might be doubtful is not valid. The outer objects 
are empirically “substance in appearance” (A379).
What does it mean, incidentally, that the outer objects are also my representations? It is 
obvious that this does not mean that the representations regarding outer things are also what 
I represent, because what Kant expects as the ground here is the immediacy of the perception 
of myself, namely, of self-consciousness. In short, Kant considers that the representations of 
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outer things belong to self-consciousness. “All possible appearances belong, as representations, 
to the whole possible self-consciousness” (A113), and “all objects with which we can occupy 
ourselves are all in me, i.e., determinations of my identical self” (A129).
Thus, according to Kant’s statements in the first edition of KrV, we do not have to assume 
that the cognition of outer things must be related to things in themselves, which is outside us. 
This opinion resulted in considerable criticism and misunderstandings, and it was Fichte who 
trusted nevertheless in it and pursued to get through with it to a more comprehensive form5.
2. The Empirical Realism in Second Introduction to Wissenschaftslehre
Fichte criticizes his contemporary tendency to interpret Kant’s philosophy as dogmatic 
(realistic). Kant declared that we are affected by the object (cf. A19/B33), and those dogmatic 
readers understand this object as a thing in itself. However, Fichte declines this and asserts as 
follows:
What, then, is the object? That which is added to appearances by understanding, a 
mere thought.—The object affects us; something that is merely thought affects us. 
What does this mean?… [I]t affects us insofar as it exists, that is, it is merely thought 
of as affecting us. … [C]ertainly, our knowledge all proceeds from an affection, but 
not affection by an object. This is Kant’s view, and also that of the Wissenschaftslehre. 
(VNDWL, GA I/4, 241; SK, 59-60)
This prima facie inconsistent assertion reflects Fichte’s view of empirical consciousness that 
forms the starting point of philosophy. What he means here are the following two points. (1) 
In general, to exist means nothing more than we must consider so. (2) We start from the fact 
that we are specifically determined in the empirical consciousness, but it does not contain 
the moment of “by what” (yet). In the first place, we should note that Fichte prefers the term 
“determinacy” (as meaning to be determined) to “affection,” and here uses the latter only to 
explain Kant’s statement. 
According to Fichte’s thought, the determinacy in consciousness “appears as the 
absolutely contingent, and provides the merely empirical constituent of our cognition” (242; 
5 As I have argued elsewhere, Fichte also has sympathy rather with Kant’s A-deduction than the 
B-deduction, as to the concept of transcendental apperception. See Michihito Yoshime, “The Problem 
of “können” in Kant’s B-Deduction and Its Significance for Fichte,” Revista de Estud(i)os sobre Fichte 
[Online], 17, 2018, connection on 20 September 2020 (URL: http://journals.openedition.org/ref/914).
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61). It is a feeling of, for example, sweet, red, cold, and the like. These dogmatic Kantians 
try to explain this feeling as efficacy of thing in itself. However, it is difficult to solve the 
problem of how objective things in itself become the cause of subjective presentations.
In contrast, Fichte lays down as the ground of experience, not the thing in itself but the 
“self in itself” (190; 10). Presentations of outer things appear for us as accompanied by a 
“feeling of necessity” (186; 6)—in particular, we get to see the presentations accompanied 
by feelings of necessity as presentations of outer things—and this should be regarded as the 
consequence of the self-determining of the self in itself through giving itself a law (self-
legislation) and acting in a specific way obeying the law (cf. 199ff.; 20-22). However, this is 
a transcendental explanation, and the empirical self does not explain its own feeling as such.
[B]y intuition it [the empirical self] creates for itself an extended matter, to which it 
carries over, by thought, this purely subjective element of feeling, as to its ground, and 
by this synthesis and explanation of its own state gives it its system of the world; and 
observation of the laws of this explanation provides the philosopher with the science. 
Herein, Kant’s empirical realism, which is also a transcendental idealism. (243; 61-62)
Thus, we may conclude that empirical realism consists of science, in that the empirical self is 
forced to see the subjective feeling as an extended matter. Fichte asserts that his view is the 
same as Kant’s. Is that indeed so?
3. Fichte’s Kant-interpretation and the Problem of Thing in itself
Fichte’s criticism of the dogmatic Kantians is combined with his strong belief that Kant 
denied thing in itself, or, at least, he should have. However, was the view that Kant intended 
to maintain not more complicated than Fichte considers it to be?
It is fact that Kant declined transcendental realism. However, he did not declare that 
thing in itself does not exist at all. Even in “Fourth Paralogism” he referred to a “transcendental 
object” as follows: “We can admit about our outer intuition that its cause is something what 
may be outside us in a transcendental meaning…” (KrV, A372). What Kant asserted, to be 
precise, was only that thing in itself is for us unknown. Kant in Prolegomena and the second 
edition of KrV seems apparently more positive about thing in itself. In the former, he states 
that “both [space and time] are not determinacy that belongs to thing in itself, but just the 
determinacy that belongs to the relation of the thing in itself to sense” (P, AA IV, 284), and 
“our sensitive representations are definitely not the representations of things in themselves, 
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but only the representation of how they appear to us”(287, n.1).
Moreover, with regards to the latter, the following passage is famous:
However, the reservation must also be well noted that we must at least be able to think 
of them as things in themselves. Otherwise, there would follow the absurd proposition 
that there is an appearance without anything that appears. (KrV, BXXVI)
Kant cannot deny the existence of thing in itself—or “noumena” (B306)—due to the 
necessity of transcendental ideas such as freedom, god, and immortality, postulated by 
practical reason. However, needless to say, theoretical reason is not able to have cognition 
of them. Therefore Kant characterized them as unknown and that we can neither affirm their 
existence, nor their nonexistence.
However, Fichte did not consider that such a complicated position could be maintained. 
The primary idea of transcendental idealism, which was shared with Kant, that “all 
consciousness is consciousness of ourselves” (WLnm, GA IV 2, 197) is in Fichte mediated 
by the idea that we must choose either thing in itself or the absolute I and arrive at the 
following conclusion: “Nothing outside me, nor thing in itself, but I can be the object of my 
consciousness. This is the primary maxim and the deepest spirit of transcendental idealism” 
(163).
However, how does Fichte preserve the transcendental ideas? Regarding freedom, Fichte 
preserves it by thinking a great deal of the unity of the theoretical and practical reasons, and 
placing the absolute activity of selfhood (that is, freedom) as the supreme principle of the 
two (cf. SS, GA I/5, 27). However, it must become difficult to explain god as a being if the 
selfhood is placed at the top of the system—even if the self would be distinguished clearly 
from individuality and understood as “our mental nature” (VNDWL, I/4, 257) in general. In 
the Wissenschafhtslehre nova method, Fichte states that god and the world “depend upon 
our reason” (WLnm, GA IV/2, 97). Even if this was not the immediate cause of the atheism 
debate6, such a position could barely practically maintain him on the assumption of das 
Absolute in his Berlin years.
6 As is well known, the immediate cause was the paper “On the Ground of Our Belief in a Divine 
World-Governance.”
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4. Empirical realism in “Transcendental Logic” lecture
Fichte referred to Kant’s same argument in his TL lecture in autumn 1812. According 
to this, opponents of WL consider that WL, as an idealism, denies the categorical “is,” 
which is just a misunderstanding. WL does not deny expressions such as “there is a stove in 
front of me.” We then have further the concept of a real being outside the intuition of “is,” 
and precisely this real being is denied in regard to the empirical phenomenon. It must be 
distinguished between being and its Bild (image). Based on this, Fichte states that:
Kant wanted to say this, or at least should have wanted it, when he says that his 
system is empirical realism, but transcendental idealism, and we can acquire this 
expression as well explained. Empirical realism: The categorical is [is] admitted. 
Transcendental idealism: We raise ourselves over all phenomena to a pure concept of 
being, and when we collate the empirical with this, we find the empirical not as being, 
but as Bild. (TL, GA II/14, 372f.)
Here again, similar to Kant’s system, Fichte’s transcendental idealism is declared to have the 
aspect of empirical realism, however, different from the statement in Jena period, the concept 
of Bild is used here. In addition, it is common knowledge that Fichte in this period refers to 
das Absolute (the absolute) and this lecture is no exception. Therefore, we must confirm what 
these terms mean and verify how WL can be empirical realism.
According to Fichte, Kant stands against the philosophy that regards Wissen (knowledge/
knowing) as mere pure faculty of images to which, through itself, would be given no figure 
and no determination, and thus, the philosophy considers all figures as given by the effect of 
the thing—specifically, transcendental realism. However, Fichte continues, in the figuring 
of Wissen at least some part, and according to WL, the all, is given by Wissen itself. In WL, 
therefore, all of the thing or being is itself the figure of Wissen, and there is nothing at all 
outside Wissen (cf. 210). In short, to be is nothing other than known.
Then, what is Wissen? It consists of an indivisible combination of intuition and concept 
(cf. 209). According to Fichte’s explanation in this lecture, intuition is the Bild (a) of content 
of the absolute appearance, and concept is the Bild (b) of that (a) is not being itself, but 
its Bild. Therefore, Bild is something not a being, while it has the same content as being. 
Therefore, a being is supposed to be something that does not form an image of its content 
toward outside, that is, something does not appear, so is “the absolute closed nature in itself” 
(222), “absolute immanence in its imagelessness” (227). On the contrary, Bild is “absolute 
sich äussern, als sich äussern [expressing itself as expressing itself]” (ibid.)
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What is to be made the issue of here is how the content of Bild (a) can be described, 
assuming that the Bild (a) really and actually express itself as “the Urbild [ur-image] (the 
absolute appearance)” (229). It is wrong to consider that here the being of this Bild has been 
already posited and this Bild gives itself its content somehow inside its being (cf. 234). In 
such a case, the being of the Bild must have been the being itself than its Bild. 
Rather, the ur-image appears to itself and understands itself—to understand is “further 
to determine a being in its Bild ” (330)—not as being but as Bild, and this is the only way for 
it to be. The ur-image intuits its content in the form of Werden (becoming). But why is no 
other than this content attained through the becoming? The ur-image is the appearance of the 
absolute (cf. 240-241). “All the content of Wissen [is] simply and fundamentally through the 
immediate appearance of the absolute in it” (247). How can these two ideas be compatible?
For Fichte’s standpoint to be an empirical realism, it needs to be explained at least that 
the rejection of transcendental realism is compatible with the assumption of the absolute, 
and in what sense the categorical is is admitted. What must be emphasized here is that Fichte 
strongly denies the idea of the absolute being as substrate behind its appearance. Certainly, 
he noted that there must be an objective independent being outside the Bild; however, the 
primary principle states, “not outside the Bild ” (252). Although this might seem to be a 
paradox, Fichte does not think of a transcendental-realistic model after all. These “outer must 
be subordinated to the not-outer; [this] outer [is] an inner outer” (ibid.) Specifically, the image 
is an image of imaging and states on itself explicitly, by locating the necessity of imaging 
within itself, that it is “mere afterimage and separated reflex” (255) of being, the absolute. In 
other words, an intuition that it is not the absolute itself but its afterimage brought by imaging 
accompanies the image of the absolute, identical to the transcendental apperception.
There is no being which corresponds to the Bild of the absolute. It indicates to us the 
pure world of Bild from which the being is excluded (cf. 264). The being is only Bild, and 
“is only considered as being or the absolute through ununderstanding” (330). The world of 
Bild is the true absolute world, and the world of being is in so far it appertains to the world of 
Bild (cf. ibid.). However, the sensible world is the world of “the appearing Ich [“I”] and the 
world of the Iche [“I”s] likewise the world of object of the consciousness of the Iche” (333-
334), and “merely the material for a Bild of the Ich” (334). Although similar to the dogmatist, 
Fichte also claims a firm, standing being, not as being, but as Bild (cf. 336).
Then, what does Fichte consider under the categorical is? A formal Bild in intuition. 
This intuition is, in the fundamental Wissen whose Bild is completely and simply formal, 
especially the sense. The sense gives the is (cf. Ibid.). In the factual sense, this is always what 
is. For example, there is a stove, or something similar. This means that its mere Bild is not to 
be without posited as really being. However, it will never mean that it is not the Bild, but its 
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being itself. This is the summary of Fichtean empirical realism in his Berlin years.
Lastly, I make a comment on the temporary conclusion we have attained. Unlike 
Kant, Fichte did not consider it necessary to preserve the possibility of thing in itself for 
transcendental ideas. This is valid not only for his Jena years, but also for his Berlin period in 
which he mentions the absolute, at least in the introductory lectures. However, his empirical 
realism seems less complicated than Kant’s. This is because in the condition that thing in 
itself is thoroughly excluded, empirical idealists do not appear as strong opponents. In other 
words, defending empirical realism was important to Kant because of his delicate position 
to thing in itself. Moreover, the TL lecture, on the basis of which we have followed the 
argument, is only one of those introductive lectures to the WL. To understand his empirical 
realism in the Berlin years in relation to his theory of Bild, it is necessary to explore his latest 
WL lectures from 1810 to 1814 in detail, though I have to leave it here as a future task.
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